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BANKING SUPERVISION AND

GOVERNMENT POLICY:
INTERMEDIATION IN TODAY'S
FINANCIAL MARKETS*
Dr.John Kambhu**
I am grateful for the invitation to address some issues that I
think are important in the financial markets. I will speak about
intermediation in today's financial markets, particularly, the role
of credit risk in trading activity, and how it relates to
intermediation in its broadest sense. Please note that these are
my own personal views and not necessarily the views of the
Federal Reserve System. In fact, I will not speak about the
Federal Reserve System, but about economics, which is what I
know best.
I will begin with the importance of trading activity in today's
capital markets, similar to the issues raised earlier in this
I find it reassuring that we came to similar
symposium.'
conclusions, because it means that we all looked at the same
elephant and wound up describing it in pretty similar terms, and
therefore we were not describing different pieces of the elephant.

*

This speech was originally presented at the Derivatives and Risk

Management Symposium on Stability in World Financial Markets, held at
Fordham University School of Law on January 28,1999.
** Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Capital Markets

Research and Market Analysis Group.

Mr. Kambhu's remarks are his

personal views and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal

Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
1. See Leon M. Metzger, Recent Market Events and the Foundationfor
Global Market Crises: Hedge Funds, supra at 5; Walter H. Weiner, Recent
Market Events and the Foundationfor Global Market Crises: The Experience
of Republic NationalBank, supra at 17; Philip H. Harris, Recent Market Events
and the Foundationfor Global Market Crises: A Lawyer's Perspective,supra at

25.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADING Acnvrry

The markets for intermediated credit are becoming a smaller
percentage of financial market activity.
Tradable debt
instruments, such as bonds and notes, are market-traded
securities which are becoming increasingly important in
intermediation. In fact, in the G-7 countries over the last two
decades, the growth rate of traded debt securities has exceeded
the growth of bank lending by four-to-one. Banks are therefore
becoming less important than they used to be in terms of quantity
and volume.
In the textbook view of money and banking, all
intermediation probably occurred through the banking system.
Banks were the primary repositories of savers' capital wealth,
which they then recycled through bank loans to the real sectors of
the economy. Another point about the old banking system is that
all financial risks were bundled together on the bank's balance
sheets. Namely, credit risk, interest rate risk, and liquidity risk all
sat on the bank's balance sheet. Today's world is very different,
in that financial risks are placed directly in the hands of investors,
in the form of tradable securities.
These securities are highly differentiated, and the risks are
now unbundled. You can have one instrument, which only has

the interest rate risk, while you can buy another instrument,
which only has the credit risk. These risks have all been
unbundled and split apart in the form of different types of
securities. You can now specialize in the kind of risk you choose
to hold, or not to hold.
Prices play an important role in this system. Since the risks
are distributed into a broad array of tradable instruments, the
relative prices of these instruments must bear some coherent
relationship to each other; otherwise, the entire system falls
apart.
Trading activity enters the scenario because there are traders
or speculators out there who play an important role in the
system. Their trades maintain the coherence in the relative prices
that you see in the financial markets today. They also provide
liquidity to markets by short-term trading and by absorbing
temporary differences in supply and demand.
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Take the interest rate swap market, for example, and look at
a borrower or a bond issuer, perhaps a corporation, who has an
interest rate risk. The interest rate swap market allows lenders
and borrowers with different attitudes toward interest rate risk to
transfer the interest rate risk in the borrowing relationship to a
third party. This transfer of unwanted interest rate risk allows
the borrower to obtain better financing terms.
The interest rate swap market is able to intermediate this
interest rate risk, only because the price of interest rate
derivatives is related in some meaningful way to benchmark
interest rates. The stability of interest rate swap spreads depends
on the role of speculators who arbitrage momentary differences
in interest rate swap spreads and provide stability to the interest
rate derivatives markets. This is one example of how traders or
speculators provide meaningful links between different types of
markets in a world where all risks have been unbundled from
each other.
Another example, discussed earlier by Leon Metzger, is
convergence trades.2 Convergence traders smooth anomalous
variations in the prices of related financial instruments.
Sometimes, however, traders choose to withdraw or are forced to
withdraw from their trading activity or the markets. The buying
and selling pressures they otherwise would have absorbed or
smoothed out will immediately affect market prices. In fact, the
market turmoil during September and October of last year was
probably due in part to the withdrawal of convergence traders
from the markets.
THE POLICY IssuE

The policy issue I want to consider next is how to promote
the robustness of trading activity, given its key role in how capital
markets work today. The key question is, how can we maintain
trading activity when it is needed to provide liquidity and absorb
market shocks?
2. See Leon M. Metzger, Recent Market Events and the Foundation for
Global Market Crises: Hedge Funds, supra at 5, 6-10 (discussing various

arbitrage strategies based on the expected narrowing or convergence in value
between two different securities).

44

FORDHAM FINANCE, SECURITIES &
TAXLAWFORUM

[Vol. 4

My contention is that credit risk has an important role to play
in this issue. In considering credit risk, it is important to bear in
mind that the ultimate objective is the maintenance of market
functioning. Reducing credit risk at the expense of impairing
market liquidity would be a bad policy outcome. The ultimate
test of the policy is not whether it reduces credit risk, but rather
how it reduces risk and how that effects the rest of the economy.
THE ROLE OF LEVERAGE thN TRADING

In discussing credit risk, we must address leverage. Leverage
may be defined in various ways, but essentially it is a measure of
the degree of risk taken, relative to the ability to bear that risk.
In balance sheet terms, it is the measure of assets relative to net
worth, or vulnerability to financing risk. Leverage can also be
defined in terms of some measure of risk relative to net worth for example, value-at-risk3 . In the world of derivatives and offbalance-sheet instruments, this latter risk-based measure of
leverage is perhaps a more meaningful measure of leverage. In
fact, bank capital regulations have recently been changed to
reflect a measure of leverage that is risk-based.4
Leverage in trading activity can be acquired in three basic
forms. One is the financing of long positions through "repo" or
repurchase transactions. Another is through convergence trades
by combining long and short positions on related assets.
Leverage may also be acquired through derivative transactions.
All of these methods of obtaining leverage involve credit risk.

3. Value-at-risk [hereinafter VAR] is a type of sophisticated riskmanagement model used by banks to estimate the amount of given portfolio
loss they are likely to incur over a given period of time. See The Risk Business,
ECoNOMsT, Oct. 17, 1998, at 21, 23 (discussing VAR modeling and its

vulnerabilities). See also Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 62 Fed.
,Reg. 68,064, 68,064-65 (1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, 208, 225 & 325
as amended by 64 Fed. Reg. 19,034 (1999)) (explaining how institutions use
VAR calculations in connection with regulatory capital standards).
4. See generally James V. Houpt, Banking Supervision and Government
Policy: Developments in Capital Standards, infra at 51 (discussing recent
changes to bank capital regulations, including the Market Risk Amendment to
the Basle Capital Accord).
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Leverage allows traders to assume larger positions and
benefits the economy because it allows traders to support market
liquidity in the securities markets. Leverage can also be fragile
because high levels of leverage increase the likelihood of
insolvency. Losses on net worth may result directly in insolvency,
or in higher credit risk from leverage, which may prevent the
leveraged entity from obtaining credit to cover temporary
mismatches in cash flows of different parts of its balance sheet.
Despite its solvency, a highly leveraged entity may still fail
because it cannot obtain financing.
When leveraged investors are overwhelmed by market or
liquidity shorts, their positions at risk will be dumped back into
the market. They will either directly impact creditors and trading

counterparties through credit losses, or indirectly impact other
market participants through price changes that occur when
investors who have been willing to take on particular kinds of
risk, or high risk in general, disappear from the markets. The
indirect impact is probably most important, since price volatility
and sharp declines in asset prices will increase uncertainty about
credit risk in the economy. This can interfere with the
intermediation of credit in the capital markets, which could then
impact Main Street.
The question becomes, how should we constrain leverage?
What is the proper balance between basic liquidity providing the
benefit of leverage to support trading activity in the markets, and
the fragility of high levels of leverage?
Given investors' diverse exposures to risk, and differences in
their links to other market participants, a regulatory restriction
on balance sheet leverage is an unreasonable solution. At any
given leverage ratio, the fragility of a portfolio depends on the
price and liquidity risk of the portfolio content, and not its
leverage ratio. In addition, a high capital requirement based on
balance sheet concepts alone, will perversely encourage risk
taking because it will cause fund managers to take on higher risk
in order to meet the return targets on the required capital.
If we do not want a regulatory solution, the only game left in
town is credit discipline, which I find promising. The exercise of
credit discipline in trading relationships has the potential to
provide a balance between the benefits and costs, or the benefits
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and risk of leverage. Each counterparty's assessment of its ability
in principle to shoulder credit exposure through a leveraged
entity should constrain leverage below excessive levels. This may
occur directly through trading limits, counterparty limits, and
initial margin requirements; or indirectly, through the price of
credit that determines the net return on leveraged activities. If
creditors raise their charges on transactions with leveraged
entities, it reduces the profitability of such trades and will in turn
lower the return. Counterparty discipline, however, is not
perfect. It fails from time to time, and I think Long-Term Capital
Management' is an example of its failure.

5. On September 23, 1998, with the encouragement of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, fifteen major banks injected $3.625 billion into
Long-Term Capital Management, L.P. [hereinafter LTCM], a private
investment fund engaged in highly leveraged securities transactions based on
advanced mathematical models, to prevent its collapse and potential default
on an estimated $125 billion it had borrowed on $2.2 billion in capital. See
Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To the Rescue? A Hedge Fund Falters,so
the Fed PersuadesBig Banks to Ante Up; Firms to Lend $3.6 Billion as LongTerm Capital Loses on its Bond Bets, WALL ST. J., Sep. 24, 1998 at Al
(reporting on an "extraordinary gathering" in which the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York persuaded large banks to invest over $3.5 billion in LTCM
in return for a 90% ownership stake, and to prevent a financial crisis should it
unwind its positions); Steven Mufson, What Went Wrong? Fund's Big Bettors
Learned that Risk Trumps Math, History, WASH. POST, Sep. 27, 1998, at HI
(corrected Sep. 29, 1998) (listing fourteen major banks and institutions which
invested a total of $3.6 billion); Steven Syre, Fleet, BankBoston in Syndicate
Backing Troubled Hedge Fund,BOSTON GLOBE, Sep. 26, 1998, at F1 (reporting
that Fleet Financial Group had loaned $25 million to LTCM as part of the
bail-out); Joseph Kahn & Peter Truell, Troubled Investment Fund's Bets Now
Estimated at $1.25 Trillion, N.Y. TEms, Sep. 26, 1998, at Al (citing financiers'
estimates that LTCM had leveraged borrowings of $125 billion into $1.25
trillion in open trading positions). For comprehensive information on LTCM's
background and near-collapse, see Michael Lewis, How the Eggheads Cracked;
N.Y. TmMs, Jan. 24, 1999, § 6, at 24; Carol J. Loomis, A House Built on Sand,
FoRTUNE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 110; Michael Siconolfi, Anita Raghavan & Mitchell

Pacelle, All Bets are Off. How the Salesmanship and Brainpower Failed at
Long-Term Capital;WALL

ST.

J., Nov. 16,1998, at Al.
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DiVERSITY OF MEASURES FOR CONTROLLING CREDIT RISK

In my view, a "one size fits all" approach will not work very
well to control credit risk, because of the diversity of credit risk
and the liquidity profiles of the borrowers. There are a variety of
tools out there for controlling credit risk, such as better
information, variation margin, initial margin, other forms of
collateral, pricing and credit spreads, as well as capital
requirements and the availability of capital needed to support
credit risk. Differences among borrowers in the costs of these
different tools that creditors use to control credit risk determine
which particular method is chosen in any particular circumstance.
These differences in cost show us that a "one size fits all"
approach is not very reasonable.
Collateral information and credit spreads, for example, may
be substitutes in controlling credit risk. The method initially
chosen typically depends on the relative cost of the collateral to
the borrower, and the credit spreads which provide equivalent
compensation to the creditor for the credit risk. For creditworthy
customers, credit can be acquired on an unsecured basis, because
the credit risk spread is cheaper than the cost of providing
collateral.
For high credit risk customers, the cost of putting up
collateral is probably cheaper than paying the credit spread. A
common example is to put up your home as collateral in order to
obtain cheaper financing costs on your mortgage.
Supervisors and regulators of banks and securities firms have
not usually interfered in the private choices regarding the
different approaches taken to managing credit risk, as long as
prudential standards are generally met. The regulatory bank
capital requirements for collateralized derivative exposures, for
example,
receive
lower
capital
requirements
than
uncollateralized exposures. The decision whether or not to
collateralize an exposure is, however, left to the counterparties of
the transaction.
This approach has worked reasonably well in the over-thecounter derivatives markets. For example, credit losses over the
first three-quarters of 1998 in the over-the-counter derivatives

markets were less than two-tenths of one percentage point of the
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outstanding credit exposures for U.S. banks. In 1997, those credit
losses were less than one-twentieth of one percentage point of
outstanding credit exposures. Losses will occur from time to time
in any activity, but overall this approach has worked reasonably
well.
Another example where diversity in the management of
credit risk is good for the economy is in the use of variation
margin. In exchange-traded futures contracts, daily changes in
market value of the contract are settled by a daily cash payment
or collateral posting at the end of each day, so that every market
price change results in a cash or collateral settlement. In the
over-the-counter markets, however, the market value of the
contract becomes a credit exposure between the counterparties,

and the protection against the exposure is usually the capital of
the counterparties.
Variation margin can reduce credit exposure in a derivatives
transaction, but it imposes higher liquidity risk on the
counterparties. The protection provided by the variation margin
is worth the cost of having to post collateral on a daily basis for
counterparties with low creditworthiness, but for others it is not
worth the cost. For creditworthy counterparties, the cash flow
management demands of the variation margin imposes costs that
exceed the benefits of the credit risk reduction. Examples of this
occur in the interest rate swap market, where a borrower can use
a swap to hedge the interest rate risks of a bond obligation. The
swap can be structured so that the timing of its cash flow exactly
matches and offsets the cash flow of the bond.
In a futures contract, however, matching cash flows is
impossible. Although an exchange-traded futures contract can
provide the same exact present-value hedging of the transaction,
the cash flow mismatches between the bond obligation and the
futures position can be very large. That imposes severe liquidity
risk on the use of futures contracts to hedge interest rate risk,
particularly for corporate borrowers. The swap market has
grown so large partly because it provides this valuable service: It
economizes the scarce resource of cash for counterparties with

high credit quality. The efficient use of cash and the ability to
structure cash flows between the hedge and the underlying
position to be hedged is a great advantage.
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CONCLUSION

A diversity of credit risk management practices provides
benefits to market participants.
Public policy should not
interfere too crudely in the way market participants choose to
manage their credit exposures, since the capital markets need
exchange-traded products as well as over-the-counter products.
Neither of these market forms dominates the other across all the
criteria that are important for maintaining a functioning market.
You cannot have an economy that works very well with only
one type these markets. Forcing all trading activity onto a
futures exchange, for example, would introduce higher liquidity
risk into the financial system, and every blip in market prices
would generate large variation margin flows. That liquidity risk
could cause, in the worst circumstance, a forced unwinding or
liquidation of positions during volatile markets. Perversely, that
method of protecting against credit risk will probably cause
capital markets to become more volatile and could amplify the
volatility of asset prices. This would lead to reduced credit risk,
at the cost of increasing price risk and liquidity risk in the
financial system.

Since I am an economist, you know that at some point in my
talk I am going to say "on the other hand." I will say it now. On
the other hand, futures exchanges do provide the benefit of a
venue for trading with very low credit risk, although not totally
without it. They do, however, have high liquidity risk. In any
event, while not all trading should be forced onto futures
exchanges, at least some trading should occur there.
In conclusion, a well-functioning financial market has a need
for both exchange-traded and over-the-counter trading of very
similar products. Since we know that diversity is good for
biological populations, it is probably good for the financial
systems as well.

Notes and Observations

